After the Government of Montenegro purchased ¾ of the Port of Bar and ensured the possibility of making strategic decisions for the further development of that company, along with the announcement of the purchase of another part of the port – Port of Adria, certain speculations have arisen that new potential buyers or long-term lessees of this strategically important resource of Montenegro could appear as bidders whose interests are not compatible with the national and security interests of Montenegro. A possible letter of intent from private investors could be accompanied by an expressed willingness for additional investments and incentives in the mainland of Montenegro to enhance the strength and receptiveness of such an offer.
In the context of the abovementioned speculations, the moves of the Montenegrin Government, which recently made a number of decisions to acquire full or partial ownership of port capacities, are indicative. By doing so, the government expressed a clear intention to achieve only its temporary ownership until a tender is announced and a new concessionaire is selected.
According to publicly available information, in the past period, Russia, Serbia, as well as Chinese multinational companies expressed interest in buying the Port of Bar.
The crisis in Syria in 2011 forced Russia to look for an alternative route to station its ships in the Mediterranean. It was of great importance for Russia to maintain a permanent presence in the Mediterranean in competition with NATO. In 2013, Moscow unsuccessfully (after a two-month delayed answer by the Government of Montenegro) requested from Montenegro, which was not a NATO member at the time, that the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean could use the ports of Bar and Kotor to station and service military ships. Although Russia has since significantly strengthened its presence in Montenegro through various spheres, primarily media and politics, it is not realistic to expect that at this point, at least not directly, it could once again get involved in the race for this important resource on the Adriatic coast. It is also unrealistic that the Government of Montenegro would decide to do business with Russia or a company associated with it during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Serbia, a key regional partner of China and Russia, is as well interested in the purchase, but also in the joint development of the Port of Bar, which is continuously promoted by high-ranking addresses from Serbia. At the beginning of February 2023, a meeting of the management of the Port of Bar was held with representatives of the Chinese company CCECC, and the Elektrometal plus company, which cooperates with the Chinese in Serbia. It is important to point out that the current ruling structure in Montenegro has close ties to the authorities in Belgrade, which can open the doors of the Port of Bar to Serbian investors. In this context, the Open Balkan Initiative, insisted upon by the 43rd Montenegrin Government, is indicative. It undoubtedly opens the door to more substantial third-party influence, which could also ensure their presence in the NATO member state within the framework of this regional initiative established in Belgrade and Tirana. Serbia, as the economically and politically most influential country of the Western Balkans, has the potential to pull all other countries from the region towards other centers of power, especially considering the announced liberalization of trade relations between Serbia and China through the Free Trade Agreement, which neither the European Union nor the United States have with this country.
Chinese companies own or have a stake in a wide range of Europe’s critical infrastructure, including ports, airports, power plants, wind, solar farms, and telecommunications. This type of control opens up a number of risks, including the possibility of espionage, as well as the use of ports as commercial hubs in Europe, and favoring of Chinese companies.
Due to the investment needs of the Western Balkan countries, Beijing sees an opportunity to establish a foothold on the borders of the European Union, where their interests also lie. And while political elites in the Western Balkans perceive China’s presence as economic and largely opportunistic, they do not see the strategic and long-term implications of Chinese influence in the region. Beijing has taken advantage of the geopolitical vacuum in the Western Balkan region, created by the diversion of Western partners’ attention, by adequately assessing opportunities for investments in strategically important sectors.
In the Mediterranean, China is trying to achieve dominance in maritime transport. Currently, Chinese COSCO Shipping owns 64% of the Port of Piraeus. Also, COSCO Shipping included the Port of Durrës in its network in 2017, and there are indications that they want to include the Port of Ploče in their business plans. In 2018, the Port of Kopar officially joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. That port is of crucial importance for the Austrian, Hungarian, and Slovak markets.
A potential takeover of the Port of Bar would allow China to exert greater influence in the Western Balkan region and throughout Europe. Montenegrin political leaders have recently announced deepening cooperation between the Port of Bar and the Chinese. The Port of Bar could be a port corridor of China on the Adriatic and increase trade between Europe and Asia, former Montenegrin President Filip Vujanović pointed out at the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries Forum in Ningbo in 2019. In July 2021, a contract worth more than 10 million euros was signed between the Port of Bar and the company Zijin from Bor. Considering the evident interest and the strategic importance of the Port of Bar, the logical question arises – should only commercial interests decide on future activities related to the potential sale or concession of the largest port in Montenegro, which is a NATO member? China’s full or partial ownership of critical infrastructure would significantly increase Montenegro’s exposure as an EU candidate to Chinese pressure to achieve its geopolitical goals. Montenegro, as a country with access to the sea and a EU candidate country, but with continuously weak and politicized institutions, represents an opportunity for China to position itself as a strategically important country.
Montenegro – complying with the NATO Strategic Concept
Given that Montenegro has been a member of NATO since 2017 when implementing major investment projects, strategically important decision-makers in Montenegro should take into account the NATO Strategic Concept, which in many ways reflects changes in the strategic environment. China, which was not even mentioned in 2010, in the new Strategic Concept is described as a systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security, whereas its relationship with Russia is defined as a strengthening strategic partnership that will also likely threaten the Alliance. China’s ambitions and its policies of coercion are treated as challenging the interests, security, and values of the North Atlantic region, with concerns about the deepening strategic partnership between China and Russia. Significant announcements contained in the aforementioned document will certainly be very challenging for the member states of NATO, as they risk losing credibility if not adequately supported, which is particularly important in the case of Montenegro.
As a new NATO member with a relatively weak institutional capacity, Montenegro is strategically an ideal target for expanding Chinese influence in Europe. Western allies closely watch Chinese geopolitical investments in important infrastructure projects in Europe, such as roads, railways, and ports. Therefore, the announcement of the possibility of the Port of Bar’s cooperation with Chinese companies and investments in the continuation of the highway in Montenegro, as well as investments in railway infrastructure, should be considered and viewed also through the prism of the national and security interest of the State and the Alliance, and not only through a purely commercial interest.